The Environment and Global Competition is one of the topics studied by Professor Salo Coslovsky of the Robert F. Wagner School of Public Service. In this interesting study linked bellow, Professor Coslovsky spent  several months following Brazilian public prosecutors in their work to enforce Environmental and Labor laws. This paper looks at 4 different examples where these laws were clearly being infringed: shrimp production in the mangroves of the Brazilian north east, pig farming throughout the Southern Region, charcoal production in the western Amazon and granite mining in the state of Rio de Janeiro. The results of his research were very surprising. Brazilian prosecutors turn out to have a very different modus operandi than their American counterparts, in the sense that they take creative non-legal approaches to achieve compliance from the companies and individuals involved. In the examples mentioned above prosecutors, in addition to punishing and educating, acted much like investment bankers aiding the non-compliant companies in finding and financing new alternatives which would put them in agreement with the law. Professor Coslovsky paper sheds light on the agency and creativeness of many of these prosecutors and shows how they act as environmental ground agents. This research illustrates the potential of these regulators to be a greater part of the forefront of environmental law enforcement in productive and efficient ways which in many occasions also turn out to be economically sensible.

Source: http://www.ipea.gov.br/sites/000/2/publicacoes/tds/td_1355.pdf

Other papers by Salo Coslovsky:
http://wagner.nyu.edu/faculty/publications/files/coslovsky_the_sociological_citizen.pdf

http://web.mit.edu/salo/www/BN-Salo%20Coslovsky-%2023%20Oct%202006.pdf